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The Eurasian Economic Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia consolidates a market of 
170 million people with a combined GDP of almost 3 trillion US dollars. On paper, this union has 
the potential to transform economic relations in the region and to offer an alternative to the EU in 
the post-Soviet space.
The Union, which comes into effect from January 2015, marks the latest achievement in the current 
‘intensive phase’ of integration, which has seen the creation of a Eurasian Customs Union (2010), 
a Single Economic Space (2012) and a Eurasian Economic Commission (2012), all intended to 
facilitate the four economic freedoms – the free movement of goods, people, services and capital. 
Expanding the Union is also seen as a priority, with Armenia set to join the Customs Union and 
Kyrgyzstan already at an advanced stage of negotiation.
However, despite early successes, further deepening and widening of the Union are fraught with 
difficulties and the pace of integration will inevitably slow, as member states come to terms 
with the commitments they have made. Plans to deepen the Union have encountered a number 
of implementation issues leading to multi-speed integration from the outset. Likewise, plans 
to expand the Union have revealed a creeping politicisation that threatens to undermine the 
‘economic only’ nature of this integration project. 
More importantly, the latest phase of post-Soviet integration shows strong signs that the older 
problems of weak institutions and large asymmetry between member states are continuing to 
hinder closer ties. Taken together, and against the backdrop of an increasingly hostile international 
environment that has accompanied the crisis in Ukraine, the Eurasian Economic Union faces an 
uphill struggle to maintain momentum and deliver the results member states desire.
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Introduction1
On 29 May 2014, the presidents of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia signed a treaty creating 
a Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) between 
the three states. This treaty, which comes into 
force in January 2015, builds on the recently 
established Eurasian Customs Union (January 
2010) and is  seen as the next stage of integra-
tion following the creation of a Single Economic 
Space in January 2012. Overall, the EaEU will 
consolidate a common market of 170 million 
people with a combined GDP of almost 3 trillion 
US dollars.2 As such, the EaEU not only prom-
ises to transform economic relations in the 
post-Soviet space, but sustained development 
may yet see the EaEU develop into a regional 
counterweight to the EU.
In fact, a case can be made that the EU rep-
resents a potential partner, competitor, but 
also developmental template for the EaEU. As 
Vladimir Putin acknowledged in 2011, the 
European Coal and Steel Community took 40 
years to become a fully-fledged union, but the 
appearance of the Eurasian Customs Union 
and Single Economic Space has been much 
more dynamic, owing to the experience drawn 
from the EU and other regional organisations.3 
This open acknowledgement of ‘borrowing’, 
together with the continuing view of the EU 
as the ‘gold standard’ for regional integration, 
explains why recent studies of the Eurasian 
Customs Union have made either explicit 
1 Although this project was conducted on the initiative 
of the FIIA, we would like to express our gratitude to 
the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs for their finan-
cial assistance. We would also like to thank the Finnish 
embassies in Moscow and Astana, the Finnish Liaison 
Office in Minsk and the Embassies of the Republic of 
Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan in Finland for 
their help in facilitating the travel required for this pro-
ject. Special thanks are also reserved for Veera Laine for 
her invaluable assistance, as well as all the interviewees 
for their illuminating contributions. 
2 GDP (current US$), the World Bank. 
3 Putin, 2011.
 comparisons with the EU or implicit com-
parisons using functionalist approaches. The 
success of EU integration probably goes some 
way towards explaining the teleology in some 
studies, where the post-Soviet space, much 
like the European space, is seen as destined for 
ever-increasing integration.4
This FIIA Analysis, in contrast, does not 
approach the subject of Eurasian economic 
integration through the prism of integration 
in Europe or in any other part of the world. 
Instead, the focus is on the trajectory of the 
EaEU – whether it looks set to break the pat-
tern of so-called ‘ink on paper integration’ 
seen in the post-Soviet space over the past two 
decades, where early optimism and initial gains 
have been replaced by a lack of implementa-
tion and, ultimately, stagnation.5 This requires 
consideration of the nature of the Eurasian eco-
nomic integration, including efforts to deepen 
and widen the Union, as well as the factors 
that facilitate and slow the integration process. 
The major added value of this analysis is that it 
draws on primary data from over 35 face-to-
face interviews conducted with experts and 
stakeholders in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Rus-
sia, as well as Armenia, which is expected to 
join the Customs Union in 2014.6 This not only 
4 For an example of direct comparison between Eurasian 
and European integration, see Blockman et al., 2012; 
for a functionalist analytical approach, see Dragneva & 
Wolczuk, 2012; and for a discussion of U-shaped inte-
gration and growing interconnection in the post-Sovi-
et space, see Libman and Vinokurov, 2012. For analysis 
of the implications of Eurasian economic integration for 
the EU, see Shumylo-Tapiola, 2012 and Adomeit, 2012.
5 Vinokurov & Libman, 2012, p. 53.
6 In May 2014, Armenia’s president, Serzh Sargsyan, stat-
ed that negotiations on Armenia’s entry to the Cus-
toms Union were in their final stages (Sargsyan 2014), 
although actual membership is expected towards the 
end of 2014. Overall, this analysis reflects the balance 
of opinion expressed by all the interviewees, and where 
possible, reliability was confirmed by triangulating in-
formation with secondary sources. A full list of inter-
viewees in each country is given in Appendix 1.
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gives voice to all those involved in the integra-
tion process, but allows a comparison of each 
member state within the overall analysis of the 
EaEU.
The following material is divided into four 
parts. Part one outlines the origins and objec-
tives of the EaEU, as well as the motivations for 
individual member states to pursue integra-
tion. Part two considers the initial successes 
of the recent ‘intensive phase’ of integration 
seen since 2010, including the creation of the 
EaEU institutional framework and the initial 
impact of the Customs Union on economic 
development. Part three examines some of the 
problems with deepening and widening the 
EaEU, while the final section provides extended 
conclusions as part of an overall assessment of 
the integration process so far.
The argument put forward in this report is that 
the three founding members of the EaEU have 
already achieved notable success in pushing 
regionalism by creating the institutions needed 
to deepen and widen the project and to boost 
economic development. However, the current 
intensive phase of integration is unsustainable 
and so the pace of integration will inevitably 
slow, as member states come to terms with 
the commitments they have made. More 
importantly, the latest phase of post-Soviet 
integration shows strong signs that the older 
problems of weak institutions and large asym-
metry between member states are continuing 
to hinder economic union.
Origins and objectives of the 
Eurasian Economic Union
Although Eurasian economic integration is 
currently enjoying an intensive phase following 
the creation of the Customs Union on 1 Janu-
ary 2010, the roots of the EaEU actually lie in 
a much earlier period. The Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), founded in December 
1991, saw an agreement on creating economic 
union signed as early as January 1993 as part 
of an attempt to  gradually move towards 
an EU-style common market.7 In April 1994, 
Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, 
called for the creation of a Eurasian Union to 
lessen the impact of the collapse of the USSR, 
and in 1995, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia 
signed a treaty on creating a customs union.8 
The formation of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC) in 2000 gave renewed 
impetus to the idea of a common market and 
in 2007 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia recom-
mitted to creating a customs union, with other 
EurAsEC members (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) 
earmarked to join later.
What this tells us is that, despite the recent 
scholarly interest and media attention sur-
rounding the appearance of the EaEU, Eurasian 
economic integration is actually a long-term 
process, and more importantly, an unfinished 
process rather than a discrete event. Not only 
does this fact raise our awareness of the dif-
ficulties of breaking with the past and recon-
necting the post-Soviet space to the mutual 
benefit of all states involved, but it also raises 
a number of immediate questions, such as why 
Eurasian economic integration has taken so 
long to achieve and why the period following 
2010 has seen so much integration activity.
The answer to the first question lies in the mis-
match between committing to the principle 
of economic integration and putting it into 
practice. It has been noted, for example, that 
no more than 10 per cent of the 1,500 or so CIS 
treaties and agreements made since 1991 have 
actually been implemented.9 This is viewed 
partly as a problem of the consensus decision-
making procedures in place, but partly as the 
result of weak institutions, in particular the 
absence of supranational organs able to regulate 
7 Vinokurov 2007, p. 26.
8 See Libman and Vinokurov 2012, Appendix 2 for a chro-
nology of post-Soviet disintegration and integration, 
1991–2010. See Nazarbaev 1994 for an early discussion 
of ‘Eurasian Union’.
9 Kobrinskaya, 2007, pp. 14–15.
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implementation.10 As a result, CIS integration 
in the 1990s saw the inevitable development of 
multi-speed and multi-level integration, with 
states allowed to choose their own ‘integration 
package’ to suit their needs, but with a high 
risk of backsliding.11 There was also a problem 
of asymmetry – the fear of Russian hegemony 
and loss of sovereignty among smaller mem-
bers – which pushed many to develop multi-
vectored foreign policies to balance regional 
players and avoid Russian economic and politi-
cal domination.12 This reluctance to commit to 
Russian-led integration projects was recipro-
cated, in the 1990s at least, by Russia’s own lack 
of interest in the CIS.13 
What we see in the period leading up to 2010 is 
a change in at least two dynamics. The first is a 
change in Russia’s attitude and circumstances, 
which in comparison to the 1990s, are now 
much more amenable to integration. By the 
mid-2000s, Russia was enjoying a more reliable 
financial base as well as greater control over 
economic actors at home. Eurasian integra-
tion also received a boost during the Medvedev 
presidency (2008-2012), not because Medvedev 
was particularly supportive of regionalism, 
but because Putin assumed the post of prime 
minister and thus responsibility for economic 
matters. Putin, it should be noted, more than 
anyone else within Russia, has helped push the 
integration project forward.
The second dynamic is a convergence on a 
genuine belief that integration is an unavoid-
able global trend and that, increasingly, no 
country is able to prosper in isolation. There 
is an acknowledgement that the region is still 
coming to terms with the effects of the global 
financial crisis, and that only a joint effort is 
capable of overcoming the challenges ahead. In 
2011, Belarus was hit particularly hard by a spi-
ralling financial crisis, but neither Kazakhstan 
10 Sakwa & Webber, 1999, p. 396.
11 Vinokurov, 2007, p. 40.
12 Libman & Vinokurov, 2012, p. 192; Minasyan, 2012.
13 Sakwa & Webber, 1999, pp. 402–404.
nor Russia have avoided the negative conse-
quences of the global economic downturn, 
and so this international factor is seen as one 
important explanation for the renewed empha-
sis on economic integration seen since 2010.14
In the period 2008–2014, both these dynamics 
served to reinvigorate the idea of economic 
integration with two clear objectives. The first 
objective is obvious – to use integration to 
achieve economic development. The second 
objective is the means to this end – to increase 
existing levels of regionalism by building an 
effective administrative-bureaucratic infra-
structure able to implement the agreements 
that form the basis of the EaEU. Regionalism is 
also aimed at deepening integration through 
realising the four economic freedoms: the 
freedom of movement of goods, people, ser-
vices and capital, but also widening integration 
to include new members and increase overall 
market size.
In terms of the aims of the individual member 
states, both Kazakhstan and Belarus see the 
advantage of gaining access to the huge Russian 
market of over 143 million people. They also 
view Eurasian economic integration as a way to 
achieve modernisation by gradually improving 
economic competitiveness while avoiding the 
‘shock’ of immediate exposure to the globalised 
world. This logic is perhaps clearest for Belarus. 
Even though Belarus is not a member of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Customs 
Union applies WTO rules (Russia’s tariff obliga-
tions), forcing domestic producers to adapt, but 
in the limited format of 3 ‘friendly’ states.
In a similar way, Kazakhstan views economic 
integration as a way to increase firm competi-
tiveness, but as part of an ongoing attempt to 
secure WTO membership. Kazakhstan also 
views the Customs Union as a means to protect 
domestic producers from the effects of trade 
with third countries, notably the growing 
14 For details on the Belarus financial crisis, see Kłysiński 
2011.
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negative trade balance with China. This touches 
on an important theme in Eurasian integra-
tion – ‘sovereignty’ – and the desire among 
all member states to enhance it by engaging in 
trade creation and trade diversion.
As detailed in the material that follows, for 
Russia, the economic benefits of union are 
less certain, although access to the Belarusian 
market of approximately 9 million people and 
the Kazakhstani market of 17 million are by no 
means insignificant. Moreover, the manipula-
tion of both tariff and non-tariff barriers may 
enable Russia to implement a programme of 
import substitution, in particular in the auto-
mobile and aircraft manufacturing sectors.15 
There is also the benefit of a common market 
for private interests, as the EaEU immediately 
provides opportunities for Russian businesses 
located along the 6,800-km Russia-Kazakhstan 
border to move their operations and take 
advantage of the favourable tax climate in the 
latter.16
Intensive integration 2010-2014 
The argument advanced in this report is that 
the three founding members of the EaEU have 
already achieved notable success in push-
ing regionalism by creating the institutional 
framework needed to deepen and widen the 
project and boost economic development. The 
latter is seen as a major objective of the Union 
and is typically formulated in terms of increas-
ing quantitative indicators such as economic 
growth, trade volumes between member states, 
15 The Customs Union includes a mechanism for redis-
tributing customs duties among the budgets of the 
three member states. Increases in certain tariffs that 
may benefit only one member state can be compensat-
ed for by increasing the percentage of tariffs redistrib-
uted to the other members.
16 Kazakhstan’s tax rate on commercial profits in 2013 
was 28.6%, compared to 50.7% in Russia and 54% in 
Belarus. See total tax rate (% of commercial profits), 
the World Bank.
manufacturing output, foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), firm competitiveness and con-
sumer choice, but more qualitative outcomes 
such as an improved business climate are also 
important.
However, the task of determining the real eco-
nomic success of economic integration is more 
complicated than it first appears. What is clear 
is that the EaEU remains a work in progress 
and that the relatively short operational exist-
ence of the Eurasian Customs Union and Single 
Economic Space give only an approximate idea 
of the potential of the EaEU. There is also the 
problem of the reliability of official statistics 
across much of the post-Soviet space, as well as 
an acknowledgement that the removal of tariff 
barriers between the three member states has 
led to an unexpected deficit of reliable informa-
tion on trade flows. These reasons alone should 
elicit a degree of caution when drawing con-
clusions on the economic effectiveness of the 
Customs Union and future EaEU.
In addition, there is the issue of determining 
the effects of the Customs Union, 2010–2014, on 
the economic performance of the three member 
states against the backdrop of global economic 
conditions. For example, trade volumes among 
member states show an overall decrease in 
2013 compared to 2012 and 2011 (see Table 1) 
and although media sources were quick to see 
this as evidence of Customs Union failure, this 
drop in trade is largely explained by volatility in 
global commodity markets.
This becomes clearer when we consider the 
structure of mutual trade between the three 
Customs Union member states, where trade 
in mineral products, which includes oil, is by 
far the largest sector (33% of the total trade 
volume) followed by machinery, hardware and 
vehicles (20.4%), metals and derived products 
(12.9%) and agricultural produce and foodstuffs 
(12.8%). In fact, in 2013, the decreasing trade 
volume in mineral products and in those sectors 
reliant on hydrocarbons (chemical products 
and related industries) disguises a year-on-year 
increase in several manufacturing sectors.
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Elsewhere, economic indicators show mixed 
results. Trade between the Customs Union 
member states, China and the EU, for example, 
shows little change in the period 2011-2013 (see 
Table 2), and GDP annual growth as a base indi-
cator of economic development was actually 
lower in each member state in 2013 compared 
to 2010 when internal tariffs were abolished.17 
In contrast, and despite problems in accurately 
measuring FDI due to offshore transfers, in 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia FDI in 2013 was 
slightly up on 2010 levels.18 In terms of improv-
ing the business climate in each of the three 
member states, the World Bank’s authoritative 
‘ease of doing business index’ shows improve-
ments for Belarus (rank 63 in 2013 from 67 in 
2010), Kazakhstan (50 in 2013 from 58 in 2010) 
and Russia (92 in 2013 compared to 122 in 2010), 
although clearly there is much work to be done 
here.19
17 In 2013, GDP growth in Kazakhstan was 6%, slightly 
down on 2010 levels (7.3%). However, in Belarus (0.9% 
in 2013 compared to 7.7% in 2010) and Russia (1.3% in 
2013 compared to 4.5% in 2010) there was a sharp de-
crease. See GDP Growth (annual %), the World Bank.
18 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current 
US$), the World Bank.
19 See Ease of doing business index, The World Bank.
As for increasing competitiveness, measures 
tend to be approximate, although the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Index survey of 144 countries (Belarus not 
included) shows small gains for Kazakhstan 
in 2013–2014 (rank 50) and Russia (rank 64) 
compared to the previous year.20 One alterna-
tive indication of increasing competition is 
found in the frequency of business complaints 
in the national media directed at competitors. 
Complaints ranging from Belarusian agricul-
tural machinery producers, to Russian textile 
producers to Kazakhstani mineral companies 
serve to highlight the pressures of increasing 
competition in the conditions of an enlarged 
market.21
Beyond economic indicators, the goal of fur-
thering regionalism has also been highlighted 
as important for the development of the EaEU. 
As mentioned, this includes deepening and 
broadening the integration project, but also 
creating the institutions able to oversee the 
integration process. Overall, the creation of the 
20 Global Competitiveness Index, 2013–2014.
21 The absence of reliable economic indicators makes 
the national press in each member state an alterna-
tive source of information on levels of optimism among 
business leaders, as well as the tensions created by in-
creasing competition.
million US 
dollars
% to 
previous 
year
million US 
dollars
% to 
previous 
year
million US 
dollars
% to 
previous 
year
million US 
dollars
% to 
previous 
year
2010 47,134.6 129.1 10,418.4 148.2 5,999.2 166.6 30,717.0 118.7
2011 63,100.9 133.9 15,182.9 145.7 7,103.3 118.4 40,814.7 132.9
2012 67,856.4 107.5 17,116.3 112.7 6,228.7 87.7 44,511.4 109.1
2013 64,136.1 94.5 17,698.1 103.4 5,863.6 94.1 40,574.4 91.2
Jan-Jun
2014 17,125.0 87.6*27,638.7 88.3* 8,005.7 93.7* 2,508.0 77.8*
Customs Union and 
Single Economic Space
of which
Belarus Kazakhstan Russian Federation
Table 1. volume of trade between Customs union member states, 2010–2014. 
Source: Evraziiskaya konomicheskaya Komissiya (a). *Comparison to January-June 2013.
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Customs Union in 2010 and Single Economic 
Space in 2012 were significant moments in 
realising the free movement of goods between 
member states, and road maps for gradually 
realising the free movement of people, services 
and capital are already in place. The EaEU also 
took a big step forwards with the establishment 
of the permanent ‘supranational’ body in the 
form of the Eurasian Economic Commission in 
February 2012.
The main goals of the Commission are to sup-
port the functioning of the Customs Union and 
to facilitate deeper integration. Despite some 
opinions to the contrary, the Commission actu-
ally enjoys a great deal more independence as 
an institution than is commonly acknowledged 
and Russian pressure over decision-making 
is exaggerated. Not only is unanimity voting 
in place to protect individual members, but 
the Commission is staffed with highly quali-
fied ‘international’ bureaucrats who are not 
permitted to lobby on behalf of national inter-
ests.22 To date, the Commission has proved its 
effectiveness in terms of operational interfer-
ence in a number of areas, including state 
purchases, customs regulations, permits for 
trafficking goods and import quotas as well as 
passing a large volume of legislative-regulative 
documents.
The Commission has also established a number 
of consulting committees in areas concerning 
taxation and financial markets, which are seen 
as important steps towards greater inclusion 
22 There is some qualified majority voting for low-level 
decision-making within the Commission. 
of the business community in the decision-
making process. These consulting commit-
tees are accompanied by a variety of forums 
which typically include representatives from 
state and private organisations.23 The Eurasian 
Commission’s Board for Customs Coopera-
tion, for example, has ongoing dialogue with 
representatives of the business community in 
each of the three member states, in areas such 
as customs legislation.
In terms of structure, the Commission consists 
of a Commission Council, which is the high-
est body and includes three deputy prime 
ministers from each member state, as well as 
a Commission Board. The Eurasian Commis-
sion has 23 departments whose jurisdiction 
is divided between the ministers of the Board. 
Both the Commission Council and the Board are 
subordinate to an Inter-Governmental Council 
which comprises the heads of national govern-
ment in each member state. This body, in turn, 
is subordinate to the Supreme Council, which 
includes member state presidents. The Eurasian 
Court, which was originally created in October 
2000 under the aegis of EurAsEC, completes the 
institutional framework of the EaEU.
When it comes to widening the integration 
project – another major objective of the EaEU 
– the expected addition of Armenia to the 
Customs Union in 2014 is seen as a concrete 
achievement, not least because of the impulse 
it provides for further expansion. Kyrgyzstan 
is currently at an advanced stage of negotiation 
23 Suggestions from these committees are then passed to 
the Commission Board for final consideration.
million US 
dollars
% to 
previous 
year
million US 
dollars
% to 
previous 
year
2011 468,960.2 130.3 107,849.4 142.9
2012 491,123.9 104.8 114,381.2 106.5
2013 492,088.3 99.9 114,587.8 102.3
EU* China
Table 2. Customs union trade with the European union 
(EU) and China (total turnover). 
Source: Evraziiskaya Ekonomicheskaya Komissiya (b). 
*Including the Republic of Croatia from July 1, 2013.
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to join the Customs Union, and this would open 
up possibilities for neighbouring Tajikistan in 
the medium-term future. Membership of the 
EaEU, it should be noted, is flexible and the 
treaty signed in May 2014 allows member states 
to leave of their own accord.24
Ultimately, the achievements of Eurasian 
economic integration, even at this early stage, 
are not confined to developing regionalism 
and boosting economic development, but have 
hinted at positive unintended consequences. 
One example is the contribution of the Customs 
Union to reducing levels of corruption.
If some producers once resorted to illegal 
methods to get their goods to cross-border 
markets, such as bribing border officials, then 
the removal of tariffs has alleviated this prob-
lem. The removal of internal customs controls 
has also curtailed opportunities for ‘confis-
cating’ goods, which was a common practice 
among customs officials and border guards. At 
the same time, the Customs Union also prom-
ises to cut red tape by enabling companies to 
make declarations in electronic form, and this 
reduction of the interface between business 
and bureaucracy is seen as a key to reducing 
corruption.25
Elsewhere, there is a suggestion that the top-
down institutional arrangement of the EaEU 
can improve economic decision-making at 
the national level. In a region characterised 
by electoral authoritarianism, where loyalty 
takes precedence over economic efficiency, 
national governments lack stimuli to make 
effective decisions in the economic sphere. 
There is some optimism that the EaEU can have 
24 See Article 118 of the Union Agreement, Evraziiskaya 
Ekonomicheskaya Komissiya, 2014.
25 The so-called ‘single window principle’, where all 
documents related to an economic activity are locat-
ed together in electronic form, promises to speed up 
business transactions once fully implemented in Ka-
zakhstan and Russia. In Belarus, the system is already 
widespread.
a trickle-down effect, where competition ‘from 
above’, in particular among the three heads of 
state, but also within the Eurasian Commission, 
will spur national governments to develop bet-
ter policies.
Deepening and widening the Union
Deepening and widening the Union are seen 
as key directions for the EaEU by all member 
states, although it is fair to say that ongoing 
problems in both areas underline the enormity 
of the integration task. In some cases, the 
rapid progress seen since 2010 has exacerbated 
these problems, leaving little time to define 
institutional competencies. A good example 
can be seen in the form of the Commission’s 
existing Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) 
procedures designed to give feedback on Com-
mission legislation which, to date, remain 
weakly elaborated. There are also problems 
with non-tariff barriers, which although used 
by all regional trade blocs as a way to prevent 
goods from entering a territory from a third 
country, are presently used by Customs Union 
member states against each other. As with per-
fecting RIA procedures, resolving the problem 
of non-tariff barriers is essentially a question 
of time and, in this case, unifying the technical 
and safety standards between member states.
However, in some areas, the challenge of 
deepening the Union is a little more complex 
than elaborating better procedures at the 
supranational level. As the experience of the EU 
has shown, deeper integration, including the 
removal of non-tariff barriers, has been largely 
achieved on the strength of supranational 
institutions.
However, EaEU institutions continue to 
privilege national over supranational decision-
making. For example, the Eurasian Com-
mission enjoys limited supranational powers 
because Commission decisions can be vetoed 
by one country at the level of minsters/heads 
of state. As such, the Commission functions 
as a true supranational organ only when there 
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is full agreement on an issue among member 
states and is closer to an ‘intra-governmental’ 
organ than a ‘supra-national’ body. Not only 
is there a danger that expansion of the Union 
will increase the risk of vetoes deadlocking the 
integration process, but there is some doubt 
that the supranational component of the EaEU 
is strong enough to overcome the historical 
problem of implementation seen in previous 
stages of post-Soviet economic integration.
In short, the future of Eurasian integration is 
very much conditioned by the extent to which 
member states, represented by the heads of 
state in the Eurasian Supreme Council, are 
able to harmonise their economic and political 
interests. As all important decisions are passed 
up the chain of command, from Eurasian 
Commission Board to Commission Council to 
Supreme Council, there are ample opportuni-
ties to defend national interests. Even if the 
Commission decides to pursue infringement 
procedures against a member state via the 
Eurasian Court, they must simultaneously 
notify the Supreme Council, opening up the 
possibility of lengthy behind the scenes bar-
gaining between heads of state.
In these terms, the idea that the EaEU is doing 
what the EU did in a fraction of the time fails 
to take into account the qualitatively different 
logics of implementation. The Eurasian Com-
mission may monitor enforcement in member 
states, but compliance with any decision will 
only happen if the heads of state in the Eurasian 
Supreme Council agree on an issue and then 
give the signal to their national bureaucracies 
to implement. Then, there is the classic prin-
cipal-agent problem of bureaucracies ignoring 
these signals, as well as the role of weak formal 
institutions, notably the rule of law, in putting 
them into effect.
At a deeper level, implementation is also slowed 
by the fear among some member states of liber-
alising too fast. This fear is particularly evident 
in the case of Belarus, which despite possess-
ing an export-oriented economy that requires 
integration with other markets to prosper, 
lags behind the other member states on most 
economic measures of note. Small and medium 
businesses lack competitiveness compared to 
Russian and Kazakhstani rivals and are poorly 
positioned to take advantage of the scale effects 
of the enlarged market. Belarus’s economy is 
also heavily subsidised by the state and is the 
least liberal of the three existing members, cre-
ating certain contradictions in terms of Minsk’s 
attitude to the EaEU.
What this means is that even before the EaEU 
formally appears in January 2015, there is a 
situation of multi-speed integration, both 
between member states, but also in the degree 
to which the four freedoms are being realised. 
So far, only two of the four economic freedoms 
– the free movement of goods and people – are 
close to being realised, but both have problem 
areas.
Currently, there are a number of goods that 
are not subject to free trade. These goods are 
typically labelled ‘sensitive’ because member 
states are reluctant to open their markets to 
competition in these areas. The alcohol and 
tobacco sectors are prime examples due to dif-
ferent excise rates in the three member states 
and the amount of tax revenue they generate, 
but medicine and pharmaceuticals can also be 
added to this list.
In terms of the free movement of people, one 
of the most pressing issues relates to the abil-
ity of entrepreneurs to register a company and 
then bring in labour and personnel from other 
member states. Residency is an issue because 
citizens are obliged to pay taxes in the country 
where they are registered, rather than the loca-
tion of their economic activities. The opportu-
nity for Russian companies to relocate to either 
Kazakhstan or Belarus and take advantage of 
lower tax rates, wage levels and production 
costs is currently hindered by existing resi-
dency requirements.
Elsewhere, the free movement of services and 
capital is unlikely to be realised in the foresee-
able future. Kazakhstan was able to negotiate an 
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opt-out for liberalising transportation services 
to protect domestic carriers. There is still no 
non-discriminatory access to the Russian gas-
transport system for Belarusian and Kazakh-
stani suppliers, and only by 2025 is a common 
energy market envisaged that will finally 
resolve this problem. Although there are plans 
to create a regulative body to coordinate stand-
ards for a common financial market, the latter 
is not envisaged before 2025. Currency union 
is also seen as unrealistic by member states at 
this juncture, although if it were to happen, 
then transferring the financial centre to Astana 
would seem a logical concession, in view of the 
fact that the Eurasian Court is located in Minsk 
and the Commission in Moscow. However, this 
step would almost certainly produce a negative 
reaction from Russian business, further com-
plicating the process.
In fact, the subject of establishing a single cur-
rency, as well as a Eurasian Parliament, has 
surfaced repeatedly since 2010, but usually in 
the form of a sharp rebuttal on the need for 
either in the format of the EaEU. This relates to 
the second, inter-connected problem of deep-
ening and widening Eurasian economic inte-
gration – politicisation – and the strong desire, 
particularly in Belarus and Kazakhstan, to keep 
this project focused purely on economic goals 
and to reduce the political component to its 
bare minimum. The name Eurasian Economic 
Union, with the emphasis on Economic, is no 
accident, but reflects a widely held belief that 
business and economic interests will always 
find a common language, but as soon as a politi-
cal component is introduced, dialogue becomes 
strained. 
This does not mean that the political compo-
nent in Eurasian economic integration is totally 
absent. For every member state there is a com-
bination of political and economic considera-
tions that are driving the integration process. 
For both Belarus and Kazakhstan, the economic 
considerations are primary. Economic union is 
seen as a way to modernise and improve com-
petitiveness as well as strengthen sovereignty 
by creating barriers for other actors in the 
region, notably the EU and China, to limit the 
economic threat posed by ‘external’ powers. 
However, the threat to sovereignty is not only 
economic. As events in Ukraine in 2013/2014 
demonstrated, the ‘European choice’ carries 
an existential political threat for elements of 
the post-Soviet ruling elite, and China, for all 
its economic clout, is still viewed in much of 
the post-Soviet space with suspicion. In many 
ways, Eurasian integration is an affirmation of 
strong, centralised power and a means to limit 
external interference in domestic political 
affairs from outside actors promoting a quali-
tatively different set of values.
However, when it comes to the Russian state, 
there is a widespread belief that, unlike 
Belarus and Kazakhstan, the political com-
ponent driving integration is much stronger. 
Although access to the smaller markets of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and even Armenia is not 
insignificant, integration is presently costing 
Russia more than the accrued benefits. Russia 
heavily subsidises Belarus and Armenia, and 
has already promised 1.2 billion USD to help 
Kyrgyzstan restructure its economy ahead of 
Custom Union membership.26 For these reasons, 
economic motivations are seen as secondary for 
Russia.
Although the exact nature of Russia’s motiva-
tions for integration are open to speculation, in 
essence, and aside from Putin’s desire to assert 
his credentials as a regional leader capable 
of overseeing big regional initiatives, Russia 
is pursuing Eurasian integration to secure a 
market share in the region ahead of competing 
actors, namely the EU and China, in what is 
clearly a fight for political influence too. Rus-
sia also sees Eurasian integration as a way to 
counter US influence and to create a multipolar 
world with the Eurasian space/civilisation 
as one of the poles. The upshot is that despite 
26 For information on Russia’s financial assistance to 
Kyrgyzstan, see Vedomosti 2014, and for a more general 
discussion on the economic costs of the Union for Rus-
sia, see Knobel 2014.
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attempts to limit the political component, the 
EaEU is an inherently politicised union from 
the outset. At present, this politicisation is most 
readily seen in the question of enlarging the 
Customs Union and the EaEU, and in the dif-
ferent approaches of the three member states 
towards new members.
Both Belarus and Kazakhstan stand against 
rapid expansion or expansion as an end in itself, 
and both emphasise the importance of uniform 
economic criteria for admitting new members. 
Belarus supports the principle of enlargement 
as a way to increase the weight of the Union on 
the international stage, but also understands 
that new members may create problems for 
domestic producers, depending on the condi-
tions of membership.
Armenia, which like Belarus has a share of 
the Russian agricultural produce market, was 
granted a transitional period to implement 
Customs Union requirements because of pre-
existing WTO commitments. This has already 
raised concerns in Belarus that Armenian pro-
ducers will have a competitive advantage.
For Kazakhstan, enlargement should be eco-
nomically beneficial for member states and 
should not damage relations with third coun-
tries. The problem is that both Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan are failing to meet these criteria. In 
the case of Kyrgyzstan, the problem is mainly 
economic. The country has a GDP per capita of 
just 1,263 USD and the Central Asian republic 
is a key transit hub for the re-export of cheap 
Chinese goods, which poses a direct threat to 
Kazakhstani producers.
Although Armenia’s economic situation is 
not much better, there are additional prob-
lems with borders. Not only does Armenia 
not have a common border with any Customs 
Union member state, but as no member state 
acknowledges either the independence or 
the annexation of the break-away region of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian membership 
of the Customs Union could not include the 
former.27 More importantly, Armenia’s inclu-
sion in the Customs Union and EaEU compli-
cates Kazakhstan’s multi-vectored foreign 
policy, which emphasises good relations with 
regional partners such as Turkey and Azerbai-
jan – both of which have strained relations and 
closed borders with Armenia.
Ultimately, in the absence of clear economic 
criteria for incorporating new members, there 
is a concern that EaEU expansion will be driven 
solely by Moscow’s desire to secure influence 
in certain regions. Armenia’s surprise deci-
sion announced in September 2013 not to sign 
an Association Agreement with the EU and to 
pursue a ‘Eurasian’ path of integration was the 
result of direct pressure from Moscow and the 
latter’s view of the South Caucasus as a key 
zone of influence. One danger of politically 
motivated expansion is that it will weaken 
the economic potential of the Union. Another 
danger is that Belarus and Kazakhstan will seek 
to use Moscow’s politically motivated desire to 
expand the Union to negotiate further opt-outs 
and thus slow the integration process.
Conclusion: A break with the past?
Any forecast of the future of the EaEU is com-
plicated by a number of factors, not least the 
mood of optimism surrounding the signing of 
the treaty on May 29 and Armenia’s expected 
accession to the Customs Union. There is also 
clear evidence that the EaEU represents a more 
serious phase of post-Soviet economic integra-
tion and that, for the time being, the commit-
ment of member states ensures that the EaEU 
will be more than ‘ink on paper’.
27 There is also an issue with the porous de-facto bor-
der between Nagorno-Karabakh and Iran that could see 
goods enter Customs Union territory illicitly. Kazakh-
stan, it should be noted, is also uncomfortable with the 
potential incorporation of unrecognised states into the 
Customs Union and EaEU, such as South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, but also the newly annexed Crimea.
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However, the problems highlighted in the pre-
vious section are by no means easy to resolve, 
mainly because they have been fundamental to 
both the success and failure of post-Soviet eco-
nomic integration over the past two decades. As 
argued in this report, the latest phase of post-
Soviet integration shows strong signs that the 
previous path dependency has not been broken, 
and that weak institutions and the large asym-
metry that exists between member states are 
continuing to hinder economic union.
The problem of implementation and multi-
speed integration really relates to the longer-
term issue of weak institutions. In a somewhat 
counter-intuitive way, weak supranational 
institutions have created flexibility, allowing 
member states to move towards each other at 
their own pace. This can be seen in a number 
of areas, not least the agreement on the Cus-
toms Union Code, which owing to the sheer 
number of disagreements between member 
states resulted in the prevalence of reference 
rules, left to the discretion of national customs 
bodies to resolve. Although this was not ideal, 
it was the quickest, perhaps only way to reach 
agreement.
Weak institutions at the national level and the 
absence of effective democratic checks and bal-
ances have also enabled the leaders of the three 
member states to make important decisions 
without the need to engage in lengthy public 
consultation or bargaining to obtain parlia-
mentary approval. The overall institutional 
design of the EaEU, with real decision-making 
located in the Supreme Council, means that the 
three heads of state can decide to take integra-
tion in different directions, to develop stronger 
supranational bodies in the future, should that 
avenue become expedient.
However, weak institutions, while being a 
short-term asset, create longer-term prob-
lems in achieving deeper integration. There is 
an opinion expressed in some quarters than 
since everyone is trying to bypass the rules and 
since the means to enforce them are so weak, it 
becomes normal behaviour to simply pretend to 
honour obligations. At the same time, although 
the advantage of the three-president model 
of integration is that it speeds up decision-
making, the quality of this decision-making is 
reduced to the qualities of just three individuals. 
The weakness of domestic political institutions 
in facilitating real public involvement, com-
bined with the weakness of formal mechanisms 
to manage leadership change in each member 
state, make the Eurasian Economic Union 
prone to rapid revision in a way quite unlike 
most other regional integration projects.
As for politicisation, this really relates to the 
older problem of asymmetry and the fear that 
too much integration will result in a loss of 
sovereignty for smaller member states. In 
effect, Belarus and Kazakhstan see a tipping 
point in the integration process – at a certain 
level, integration enhances sovereignty, but too 
much of it creates a threat. This is the deeper 
issue at play in the differing attitudes towards 
incorporating new members. As well as the 
need to balance regional partners and maintain 
multi-vector foreign policies, there is a fear 
that Russia will use new client-member states, 
notably Armenia, to pressure Kazakhstan and 
Belarus on certain issues, in effect giving Rus-
sia an additional vote in the Supreme Council. 
The reluctance to follow Moscow’s lead on all 
issues was also seen in June 2014 with Russia’s 
failure to convince Belarus and Kazakhstan to 
support the proposed EaEU-wide sanctions 
against Ukraine.
For Kazakhstan, asymmetry is part of the rea-
son why Astana wishes to slow certain aspects 
of integration. For example, realising the four 
freedoms will take time, not because they are 
considered unimportant, but because of the 
fear that bigger Russian companies stand to 
gain from rapid liberalisation. Services, for 
example, in particular in the insurance and 
banking sector, will take time to liberalise pre-
cisely because of this perception of asymmetry.
For Belarus, there is a similar concern that Rus-
sian companies with their capital and business 
acumen will take advantage of liberalisation 
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to swallow up domestic companies. Not only 
is there the threat of illegal take-overs in the 
form of reiderstvo, which are common in Rus-
sia, but also through more subtle ways, such as 
manipulating shareholders to change company 
management in favour of Russian interests.28 
As with weak institutions, asymmetry has 
often helped to push integration. Russia has 
successfully used its economic asymmetry in 
recent years to gather states around it and to 
harmonise interests, but the obvious drawback 
is that the success of the EaEU now depends to a 
large extent on Russia’s economic performance. 
Economic stagnation could see subsidies for 
members like Belarus dwindle to a survival 
minimum, with largely unpredictable results, 
serving to speed up liberalisation or halt it 
altogether.
It is in this context that the EaEU and its member 
states must find a way to realise the undoubted 
potential of Eurasian economic integration 
and to build on the successes already achieved. 
The key task is to find a balance so that the 
weakness of institutions and the asymmetry 
that exists within the Union continue to push 
integration rather than slow its progress. In the 
meantime, regional integration never occurs in 
a vacuum, and so the role of international fac-
tors should not be underestimated. The impact 
of the Ukraine crisis on the EaEU is likely to be 
far-reaching, not least because Ukraine’s par-
ticipation in the Union was a major objective for 
the EaEU to begin with. With Russia’s relations 
with the West already being described in terms 
of a new Cold War,29 and with Russia facing 
formidable structural economic problems, the 
future of Eurasian economic integration looks 
less certain going forward.
28 Reiderstvo is a form of asset-grabbing. The problem is 
acute in Russia, where criminal gangs, often in collu-
sion with the courts and security services, eject own-
ers of businesses by force and forge documentation to 
claim ownership.
29 Trenin, 2014.
In short, the easy part of integration has already 
been achieved, and what comes next, seen in 
terms of deepening, widening and stimulat-
ing economic development, will be harder to 
secure. From this perspective, the salient ques-
tion surrounding the Eurasian Economic Union 
is not whether it will succeed in achieving 
EU-style integration in a fraction of the time, 
to present itself as a partner or a rival in the 
region, but whether the latest intensive phase 
of post-Soviet economic integration, seen since 
2010, will slip into a dormant phase, where 
early gains and paper agreements mask a very 
different reality on the ground.
THE FINNISH INSTITuTE oF INTERNATIoNAL AFFAIRS 17
BIBLIogRAPHy
Adomeit, H., Putin’s Eurasian Union: Russia’s Integration Project and Policies on Post-Soviet Space, Neighbourhood 
Policy Paper, CIES, July 2012.
Blockmans, S., H. Kostanyan and I. vorobiov, Towards a Eurasian Economic Union: The Challenge of Integration and 
Unity, CEPS Special Report, No. 75/December 2012.
Dragneva, R. and K. Wolczuk (eds.), Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2012.
Ease of doing business index, the World Bank, [online] available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BuS.EASE.
xQ>.
Evraziiskaya Ekonomicheskaya Komissiya (a), Vzaimnaya torgovlya tovarami gosudarstv-chlenov tamozhennogo 
soyuza, 2011, 2012, 2013, [online] available at: <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_
stat/test-trade/publications/Pages/default.aspx>.
Evraziiskaya Ekonomicheskaya Komissiya (b), Vneshnyaya torgovlya tovarami gosudarstv-chlenov tamozhennovo 
soyuza, 2011, 2012, 2013, [online] available at: <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_
stat/test-trade/publications/Pages/default.aspx>.
Evraziiskaya Ekonomicheskaya Komissiya, Dogovor o Evraziiskom ekonimicheskom soyuze, 2014, [online] available at: 
<http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Lists/EECDocs/635375701449140007.pdf>.
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current uS$), the World Bank, [online] available at:  <http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/Bx.KLT.DINv.CD.WD/countries>.
gDP (current uS$), the World Bank, [online] available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/Ny.gDP.MKTP.CD/
countries>.
gDP growth (annual %), the World Bank, [online] available at:  <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/Ny.gDP.MKTP.
KD.Zg>.
global Competitiveness Index 2013–2014, The World Economic Forum [online] available at: <http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/gCR2013-14/gCR_Rankings_2013-14.pdf>.
Kłysiński, K., On the verge of crisis? Mounting economic problems in Belarus, oSW Commentary, [online] 04 June 
2011, available at: <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-04-06/verge-crisis-mounting-
economic-problems-belarus>.
Knobel, A., ‘Tsena tamozhennovo soyuza’, Vedomosti, [online] 13.01.2014 available at: <http://www.vedomosti.ru/
opinion/news/21197171/cena-tamozhennogo-soyuza>.
Kobrinskaya, I., ‘The Post-Soviet Space: From the uSSR to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Beyond’, in K. 
Malfliet, L. verpoest and E. vinokurov (eds.) The CIS, the EU and Russia, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Libman, A. and E. vinokurov, Holding-Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration, Hampshire: 
THE FINNISH INSTITuTE oF INTERNATIoNAL AFFAIRS 18
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Minasyan, S., ‘Multi-vectorism in the foreign policy of post-Soviet Eurasian states’, Demokratizatsiya, 2012, 20(3), pp. 
268–273.
Nazarbaev, N., ‘Evraziiskii soyuz neobkhodim: my prosto obrecheny doveryat’ drug drugu’, in N. Nazarbaev (ed.) 
Evraziiskii soyuz: idei, praktika, perspektivy, 1994–1997, Moskva: Fond Sodeistviya Razvitiyu Sotsialnykh i Politicheskikh 
Nauk, 1997.
Putin, v., Novyi intergratsionnye proekt dlya Evrazii - budushchee, kotoroe rozhdaetsya sevodnya, Izvestia, [online] 03 
october 2011, available at: <http://izvestia.ru/news/502761#ixzz28P94FwKD>.
Sakwa, R. and M. Webber, ‘The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991–1998: Stagnation and Survival’. Europe-
Asia Studies, 51(3), 1999, pp. 379–415.
Sargsyan, S., ‘v voprosakh vstupleniya v Tamozhennyi Soyuz My uzhe vyshli na zaklyuchitel’nyi etap’, Armenia Today, 
[online] 24 May 2014, available at: <http://www.armtoday.info/default.asp?Lang=_Ru&NewsID=110676&SectionID=-
1&PagePosition=2&search=Таможенный союз &mode=allwords>.
Shumylo-Tapiola, o., The Eurasian Customs Union: Friend or Foe of the EU? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
october 2012.
Total tax rate (% of commercial profits), the World Bank, [online] available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
IC.TAx.ToTL.CP.ZS>.
Trenin, D., ‘Welcome to Cold War II: This is what it will look like’, Foreign Policy, [online] 04 March 2014, available at: 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/04/welcome_to_cold_war_ii>.
Vedomosti, ‘Dlya adaptastii ekonomiki k usloviyam TS Kirgiziya poluchat $1,2 mlrd ot Rossii’, [online] 30 May 2014, 
available at: <http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/27179121/dlya-adaptacii-ekonomiki-k-usloviyam-ts-kirgiziya-
poluchit>.
vinokurov, E. & A. Libman, Eurasian Integration: Challenges of Transcontinental Regionalism. Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012.
vinokurov, E., ‘Russian approaches to integration in the post-Soviet space in the 2000s’, in K. Malfliet, L. verpoest and 
E. vinokurov (eds.) The CIS, the EU and Russia, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
THE FINNISH INSTITuTE oF INTERNATIoNAL AFFAIRS 19
APPENDIx 1: LIST oF INTERvIEWEES
Below is an alphabetical list of interviewees, grouped by country. As stated in the introduction, this report does not 
constitute the views of every participant, but reflects the balance of opinion expressed by all interviewees.
Belarus (Minsk)
Roman Brodov, Head of Foreign Economic Policy Division, Ministry for the Economy
vitaly Busko, Professor, member of the House of Representatives (Lower House of the National Assembly), Deputy 
Chairman of the Standing Commission on International Affairs
Alexander A. Filippov, Professor, Head of the youth Affairs Department, Belarusian State university of Culture and Arts; 
previously expert with the Information-Analytical Centre of the Administration of the President (2010–2013) 
Alexander guryanov, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs
vladimir Kariagin, Chairman of the Association ‘Minsk Capital union of Entrepreneurs and Employers’, president of the 
Belarusian Republican Confederation of Entrepreneurship (RCE)
Lev E. Krishtapovich, Deputy Director of the Information-Analytical Centre of the Administration of the President
Andrei Rusakovich, Professor, Belarus State university, Head of the Foreign and Security Policy Studies Centre
vladimir ulakhovich, Deputy Chair of the Chamber of Trade and Commerce of Belarus
Kazakhstan (Astana & Almaty)
Aidar Amrebayev, Head of the First Kazakhstani President Center, Institute of World Economics and Politics at the 
Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Tulegen Askarov, President of the Center for Business Journalism BizMedia
Ernar Bakenov, Director of the Department of International Economic Integration, Ministry of Economics and Budget 
Planning
Murat Karimsakov, President of the Eurasian Economic Club of Scientists Association (EECSA)
Nargis Kassenova, Director of Central Asian Studies Center, KIMEP university
Asan Kozhakov, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Darya Mukhamedjanova, Chief Research Fellow, Economic Studies Department, the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic 
Studies (KISI)
Askar Nursha, Coordinator of Projects on Foreign Policy Issues, Institute of World Economics and Politics at the 
Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan
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Dosym Satpayev, Director of the Risk Assessment group 
Alma Sultangalieva, Advisor to the Director, Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP) at the Foundation of the 
First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
Russia (Moscow)
Rustam Akberdin, Director of the Department for Development Entrepreneurship, Eurasian Economic Commission 
Askar Kishkembayev, Head of the Secretariat of the Minister for Economy and Financial Policy, Eurasian Economic 
Commission 
Aleksandr Knobel, Laboratory of International Trade, gaidar Institute for Economic Policy 
Andrey Kortunov, President of the New Eurasia Foundation; Director of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)
valentina Kravchenko, Deputy Director of the Department for Financial Policy, Eurasian Economic Commission 
Dmitry Polyanski, Deputy Director, First Department of CIS countries, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Natalya Postnikova, Senior Research Fellow, gaidar Institute for Economic Policy
gulnur Rakhmatullina, Minister for Economic and Financial Policy, Eurasian Economic Commission
Amirbek Sankubayev, Head of the Financial Market Division, Eurasian Economic Commission 
vitali Survillo, vice-President of All-Russia Public organization Delovaya Rossiya 
Natalya volchkova, Lead Economist, Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)
Armenia (Yerevan)
Alexander Arzoumanian, Deputy of the National Assembly of Armenia, Deputy Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee
Richard giragosian, Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC)
Robert Harutyunyan, Director of Armenian Development Agency, Ministry for the Economy
Alexander Iskandaryan, Director of the Caucasus Institute 
vahagn Khachatryan, Economist, the Armenian National Council
Aram Manukyan, Deputy of the National Assembly of Armenia, member of the European Integration Committee
Aghvan vardanyan, Deputy of the National Assembly of Armenia, Chair of the gas Supply Committee
